Lydell Swinson v. Blakely by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-8-2015 
Lydell Swinson v. Blakely 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Lydell Swinson v. Blakely" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1265. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1265 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
ALD-070        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2861 
___________ 
 
LYDELL SWINSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BLAKELY, Correctional Officer; FLAIM, Internal Security; LIEUTENANT LOZAR, 
LT. of 2 til 10 shift officers; SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD SCI; VOTING 
MEMBERS, For transfer approvals; MAIL AND INMATE ACCOUNT OFFICES, 
Unknown Members 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01871) 
District Judge Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 3, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 8, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Lydell Swinson (“Swinson”) appeals from the judgment of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in his civil rights 
case.  As the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
decision of the District Court. 
I. 
 Swinson is a state prisoner currently housed at SCI-Mahanoy and previously 
housed at SCI-Graterford.  While at SCI-Graterford, Swinson filed several grievances 
against correctional officer Lizette Blakely (“Blakely”), which were referred to her 
supervisor, Lieutenant John Lozar (“Lozar”).  In one grievance, Swinson alleged that 
Blakely was repeatedly searching him without justification and explicitly threatened to 
refile a civil action against her.1  He stated that he had a “long mental health history and 
her conduct can cause relapses due to my mental health conditions.”  He also 
acknowledged that prison policy allows inmates to be stopped at any time.  Subsequently, 
Blakely requested a “staff separation” from Swinson, arguing that given his criminal 
history, his self-admitted issues with mental health, and a pattern of accusations and 
threats, she was not safe near him.  Lozar denied Swinson’s search grievance, stating that 
all searches were recorded and that he could find no evidence that Blakely had searched 
or was searching Swinson. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
1 Swinson previously filed a lawsuit against Blakely, but withdrew his case. 
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 Swinson was then placed in solitary confinement.  Captain Alfred Flaim (“Flaim”) 
interviewed Swinson, who admitted that he was disoriented while he filed the grievance 
alleging searches by Blakely and did not intend her any harm.  Flaim investigated 
Swinson’s history and psychiatric record, and decided not to release Swinson from 
solitary confinement.  He recommended that Blakely be separated from Swinson, and that 
Swinson be transferred to a different prison.  Flaim’s recommendations were accepted, 
and Swinson was transferred. 
 Swinson filed a complaint alleging that these prison officials placed him in solitary 
confinement and then transferred him from SCI-Graterford in retaliation for filing his 
grievances.  He named Blakely, Lozar, Flaim, the Graterford superintendent,2 unknown 
members of the “mail and inmate account offices,” and unknown “voting members for 
transfer approvals” as defendants.  Discovery closed on June 1, 2015, and the defendants 
filed a motion for summary judgment.  Swinson requested more time for discovery.  The 
District Court granted the defendants’ motion in July 2015 and denied Swinson’s request. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
                                              
2 The superintendent was dismissed from the case because there was no indication that he 
was personally involved.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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Court’s order granting summary judgment. 3  See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 
(3d Cir. 2009).  A district court may grant summary judgment only when the record 
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  When making this analysis, a 
district court must credit the evidence of the non-moving party, and draw all justifiable 
inferences in the non-movant’s favor.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 255 (1986).  A mere “scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party]’s 
position will be insufficient” to create a genuine issue of fact.  Id. at 252.  The non-
moving party “must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a 
material fact.”  See Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007).  The 
non-moving party cannot rest on his complaint, but must point to affidavits, depositions, 
interrogatory answers, and/or any admissions in establishing that there are material, 
disputed facts.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 
 The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Swinson’s retaliation 
claims because he did not point to evidence in the record to create a genuine dispute that 
there was a causal link between his placement in restricted housing and transfer from 
Graterford and his invocations of his due process rights and right to free speech.  In order 
to succeed in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements.  First, he must 
demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally protected.  Then, he must show 
                                              
3 We may summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a 
substantial issue.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
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retaliatory action “‘sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
[constitutional] rights[.]’”  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Finally, he must establish a 
causal link between his constitutionally protected conduct and the adverse action taken 
against him.  Id.  In the prison context, the plaintiff has the “initial burden of proving that 
his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the 
decision to discipline him.”  Id.  If the plaintiff meets this burden, it shifts to the 
defendants to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they would have taken the 
same action absent the protected activity.  Id.  Additionally, a prison may encroach on an 
inmate’s constitutional rights, if “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”  
Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 
78, 89 (1987)). 
 Both Swinson and the defendants agreed that he engaged in constitutionally-
protected conduct when he filed his grievances.  All parties also agreed that he suffered 
an adverse action when he was placed in solitary confinement.  However, the defendants 
stated that they placed Swinson in restricted housing and transferred him because they 
decided that he was a danger to others, not because he filed the grievances.  The District 
Court accorded this decision deference, and we can see no reason to disagree.  See 
Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.  The defendants pointed to Swinson’s self-admitted history of 
mental health issues, his murder conviction, and his contentious history with Blakely as 
support for their actions.  Swinson contended that he was a model prisoner and that he 
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did not intend Blakely any harm.  However, Swinson did not point to any evidence that 
would create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his potential to cause harm.   
 For the reasons stated above, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
decision.  Accordingly, we deny Swinson’s requests for appointment of counsel.  See 
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1993). 
